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Fading Extraterritoriality and Isolationism?
Developments in the United States
THiE 2016 EARL A. SNYDER LECruRE
AUSTEN L. PARRISH*
INTRODUCTION

Thank you, Eyal, for that kind introduction and warm welcome.
Last year, I had the pleasure of spending time with Professor Marc
Weller when he traveled to Bloomington to give the annual Snyder
lecture, and I have long admired Professor Benvenisti's scholarship., So
I am grateful to Cambridge University, the Lauterpacht Center, and
Professor Benvenisti for hosting me this year, as we continue to
strengthen our schools' longstanding friendship and collaborations.
Having the opportunity to deliver the twelfth Snyder Lecture is a
privilege in part because of the distinguished scholars who have given
the lecture in the past. It is also a privilege because of Earl Snyder
himself. Earl was visionary in supporting these cross-Atlantic
intellectual exchanges and ahead of his time in appreciating the value of
studying transnationalism in its many forms. Today, in that tradition,
my aim is to give you a sense of how the procedural rules of
international civil litigation are developing and changing in the United
States, and how those developments in turn affect more traditional

* Dean and James H. Rudy Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law.
This article is a slightly expanded version of my Snyder Lecture delivered at Cambridge in
May 2016.
1. Of particular relevance to this lecture's topic, see Eyal Benvenisti & George W.
Downs, The Democratizing Effects of Transfudicial Coordination,8 UTRECHT L. REV. 158
(2012); Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, National Courts, Domestic Democracy, and
the Evolution of InternationalLaw, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 59 (2009); Eyal Benvenisti, Judicial
Misgivings Regarding the Application of InternationalNorms: An Analysis of Attitudes of
National Courts, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 159 (1993) [hereinafter Benvenisti, Judicial
Misgivings].
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forms of international lawmaking. In so doing, I part ways from many of
my American colleagues, who are more pessimistic about recent trends. 2

In the United States, globalization and transnational law have been
closely intertwined. For the last twenty-five years or more, international
civil litigation has been one of the ways the United States engages in
the international arena.3 Extraterritorial regulation through litigation
has permitted unilateral private initiative to advance global justice
while avoiding messy political battles, the anti-internationalism often
present in Congress, and the traditional American uneasiness in
embracing additional international commitments. 4 Litigation in
domestic courts has also been perceived as a way to close, at least to
some degree, the international system's enforcement gap. Until
recently, many scholars seemed bullish that this kind of litigation would
be a primary way to integrate international legal norms into domestic
law and to enforce those norms in advancing global justice. This attempt
to further public goals through private litigation was viewed as a
uniquely American-styled response, progressive in its orientation, to
globalization.
That effort, however, has been derailed. In a number of recent
decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court has scaled back on the ability of
plaintiffs to litigate foreign claims against foreign defendants in the
United States. The Court is not enamored with the idea that American
courts should be the world's courts, and is wary of adjudicating claims
absent a meaningful connection between the case and the United
States. The Court has rejected the notion that we live in a postnational
world or, at least, has declined the invitation to hasten a move in that
direction. This trend to limiting international litigation has occurred, to
varying degrees, in both public and private law cases.
For many committed to transnational justice, the trend is
worrisome. Commentators see it as additional evidence of an American

2. This lecture builds on themes found in earlier remarks that were made following
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum. See Austen L.
Parrish, Kiobel, Unilateralism, and the Retreat from Extraterritoriality,28 MD. J. INT'L L.
208 (2013).
3. See generally GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS (5th ed. 2011) (providing an overview of

international civil litigation in the United States).
4. See generally David Kaye, Stealth Multilateralism: U.S. Foreign Policy Without
Treaties-or the Senate, 92 FOREIGN AFF. 113 (2013) (describing the U.S. Senate's
resistance to multilateral treaties).
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retreat from international law, 5 a turn toward isolationism,6 and the
Court's reinvention of itself with a particular brand of conservative
activism.7 The worry is the trend portends a growing judicial
parochialism, 8 problematic in a globalized world where transnational
challenges predominate. In the now conventional telling, the U.S.
judiciary has once again disengaged from the broader world.
But there's an alternative to this conventional perspective, one
that's less pessimistic in outlook. In certain respects, the recent
decisions are more charitable to international institutions and the
foundational principles upon which international law rests. Admittedly,
these decisions have been largely driven by domestic considerations
untethered to transnational ones. But the Court is not necessarily antiinternational or isolationist. Instead it has been skeptical of academic
theories that have sought to expand international jurisdictional
doctrines. In this way, the recent decisions-whether explicitly or notembrace a vision for global governance and a role for domestic courts in
that system that is more consistent with foundational principles of
international law and, in many ways, more sustainable and coherent.
In these remarks, I first provide an overview of the recent U.S.
Supreme Court decisions that are the cornerstones of the trend. In so
doing, I trace a slightly different story than the one commonly told. I
connect earlier doctrinal developments to particular legal theories that
sought to broaden jurisdictional law. While this effort to reinvent
doctrine was often well intentioned, the new legal orthodoxy has not
been adept at formulating a role for national courts in global governance
that meaningfully advances transnational justice over the long term. At

5. John F. Coyle, The Case for Writing InternationalLaw into the U.S. Code, 56 B.C.
L. REV. 433, 444 (2015) (describing a judicial retreat from international law using Kiobel
as evidence of the trend); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Kiobel and the Weakening of Precedent:A
Long Walk for a Short Drink, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 841, 845 (2013) (arguing that "the
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have opted to minimize the authority of much of
international law by deploying existing doctrine in an aggressive and unprecedented
way").
6. Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1084-85
(2015) (describing the tendency of American courts to avoid foreign cases to promote
separation of powers and international comity).
7. Geoffrey R. Stone, When Is Judicial Activism Appropriate?, CHI. TRIB. (April 13,
2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-04-13/opinion/ct-perspec-0413-restraint-201
20413_ljudicial-activism-judicial-deference-judicial-restraint (asserting that "we have
now entered a troubling era of conservative constitutional jurisprudence [that] is best
characterized as 'conservative activism"').
8. See Maggie Gardner, Parochial Procedure, 69 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
(manuscript at 2-3, 7) (on file at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmn?abstractid=2651453)
(describing the assumption that U.S. courts favor U.S. parties over foreigners and U.S.
law over relevant foreign or international law, but challenging that assumption).
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worst, it may have detracted from other multilateral efforts to advance
global justice.
My remarks end on a note of concern. The response to the Court's
retreat from broad assertions of unilateral extraterritorial judicial
power9 has led some to encourage doubling down on the same failed
strategy in state courts and foreign courts.' 0 Doing so diverts attention
from the more important task of building respect for international law
and the work of international lawyers. As other nations begin to imitate
and embrace the more exorbitant and problematic aspects of U.S.
practice, one worries that the unilateral use of domestic law to regulate
foreigners for activity occurring abroad, an approach the United States
spurred but has now partly abandoned, will further fragment the
international legal system in a particularly pernicious way.
I. A PAROCHIAL TURN?
For those who believe that the U.S. Supreme Court has become
isolationist, the focus primarily is on procedural decisions in two
jurisdictional areas. The first is in the legislative jurisdiction area with
decisions addressing the presumption against extraterritoriality. The
second is in the adjudicatory jurisdiction area with decisions involving
the personal jurisdiction doctrine.
Inklings of what were to come began in 2010 with Morrison v.
National Australia Bank.n Morrison was a product of the U.S. housing
bubble and mortgage crisis, involving Australian investors who had
bought stock in Australia's largest bank. The investors claimed that the
bank's Florida-based subsidiaries had miscalculated interest rates on
mortgages it was servicing, causing the value of the parent bank's stock
to plummet. Seeking a class action remedy, the investors sued in the
United States, claiming the subsidiaries had made false and misleading
statements to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The
critical issue was whether the antifraud provisions of the U.S. securities
laws applied when foreign plaintiffs sued "foreign and American
defendants for misconduct in connection with securities traded on

9. In these remarks I focus on unilateral, domestic regulation of foreigners. I do not
focus on regulation of U.S. citizens or entities under established principles of nationality
jurisdiction. See generally Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterritorialityand the Interest of the
United States in Regulating its Own, 99 CORNELL L. REv. 1441 (2014) (exploring the
regulation of harmful conduct of the U.S. government's own officials and nationals outside
the country's borders).
10. See infra notes 37-38.
11. 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
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foreign exchanges." 12 The Court concluded that the American Securities
laws did not apply. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, the Court held,
applies "only" to "transactions in securities listed on domestic
exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities."' 3
While the full implications of Morrison may have been initially
obscured,1 4 the decision put an end (absent unmistakably clear contrary
Congressional intent) to so-called "foreign-cubed" securities litigationcases brought by foreign claimants against foreigners in relation to
shares bought on a foreign exchange. Applying a strong presumption
against extraterritoriality as a canon of construction, Justice Scalia's
opinion focused on separation of powers issues and issues of legislative
primacy. 15 Justice Stevens's concurrence-while worried that Justice
Scalia was attempting to render the securities laws toothless-agreed
that the conduct in question did not have sufficient links to, or
ramifications for, the United States.' 6 Justice Stevens and the Court's
more liberal members were worried over American courts meddling in
matters in another nation's domain.
Morrison ultimately foreshadowed what was to come. In 2013, in the
landmark Kiobel decision,' 7 the Court again emphasized that courts
should not presume that Congress intends to regulate foreigners for
conduct occurring abroad absent clear directive, even in cases involving
human rights abuses under international law. That case involved
Esther Kiobel and other Nigerian nationals who alleged that Dutch and
British oil corporations aided and abetted the Nigerian government
during the 1990s to kill, torture, and unlawfully detain them or their
relatives. The majority focused on separation of powers and foreign
policy concerns, but the decision was also animated by the implication
that courts anywhere in the world could claim universal jurisdiction
over U.S. nationals for activity in the United States. Doubling down on
Morrison and arguably expanding it, the majority found that a
presumption against extraterritoriality exists even in the context of a
jurisdictional statute.
Justice Breyer's concurrence invoked long-standing principles of
international jurisdictional law. While he would have avoided reliance
on the presumption against extraterritoriality, Justice Breyer would
12. Id. at 250-51.
13. Id. at 267.
14. See generally Harmony and Dissonance in ExtraterritorialRegulation, 105 AM.
Soc. INT'L. L. PROC. (2011) (commenting on the implications of the Morrison decision).
15. See Lea Brilmayer, The New Extraterritoriality:Morrison v. National Australia
Bank, Legislative Supremacy, and the PresumptionAgainst ExtraterritorialApplication of
American Law, 40 Sw. L. REV. 655, 658 (2011).
16. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 286.
17. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1666 (2013).
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only find jurisdiction where "the alleged tort occurs on American soil,"
"the defendant is an American national," or "the defendant's conduct
substantially and adversely affects an important American national
interest." 8 As Breyer explained, "adjudicating any such claim must, in
my view, also be consistent with those notions of comity that lead each
nation to respect the sovereign rights of other nations by limiting the
reach of its own laws and their enforcement." 9
And most recently, just this year, the Court again signaled its
wariness of transnational litigation. In RJR Nabisco, 20 the European
Union alleged that RJR played a role in an international moneylaundering scheme and sought to find it liable under the federal
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), a law
enacted to fight organized crime. While finding that Congress
affirmatively intended RICO to apply extraterritorially in certain
contexts, the Court noted, "allowing recovery for foreign injuries in a
civil RICO action creates a danger of international friction that
militates against recognizing foreign-injury claims without clear
direction from Congress."2 ' While the Court split on whether domestic

injury is a necessary predicate to a private civil suit, the Court again
was unanimous in cautioning (and distinguishing the facts of the case
before them) that generally courts should be reluctant to find U.S. law
applies to the conduct of foreigners occurring on foreign soil.22
These concerns about the overextension of American power also
revealed themselves in a second line of decisions focused on adjudicatory
jurisdiction. By 2011, it had been more than two decades since the U.S.
Supreme Court had decided a personal jurisdiction case. That year, the
Court decided two cases back-to-back, both with foreign elements. In the
first case-J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro-a plaintiff suffered
serious injuries while operating a shearing machine in New Jersey. 23
The plaintiff filed a lawsuit in state court against the shearing
machine's British manufacturer. The question was whether the New
Jersey court had personal jurisdiction over the British corporation. In
the second case-Goodyear Dunlop Tires v. Brown-the parents of two
boys who were killed in France in a bus accident brought a lawsuit in
North Carolina. 24 The lawsuit alleged that a defective tire
18. Id. at 1671.
19. Id.
20. RJR Nabisco Inc. v. European Cmty., 130 S. Ct. 2090, 2093 (2016).
21. Id. at 2095; see also Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007)
("United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world.").
22. See RJR Nabisco, 130 S. Ct. at 2115 (distinguishing foreign-cubed cases and noting
that "this case has the United States written all over it").
23. 564 U.S. 873, 877 (2011).
24. 564 U.S. 915, 918 (2011).

FADING EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND ISOLATIONISM?

213

manufactured in Turkey, at the plant of one of Goodyear's foreign
subsidiaries, caused the accident. The lawsuit named Goodyear, as well
as three of its subsidiaries organized and separately incorporated in
Turkey, France, and Luxembourg, as defendants. The foreign
defendants moved to dismiss, asserting that the North Carolina court
lacked personal jurisdiction.
In both cases the Court emphasized echoing the language from the
legislative jurisdiction context-that connections to territory are
relevant to the Court's personal jurisdiction analysis. The Court in
Goodyear explained that defendants are not subject to general
jurisdiction unless they are "essentially at home" in the forum. 25 In
McIntyre, a divided Court found that without greater connections and
contacts with New Jersey, the exercise of jurisdiction would be
inconsistent with due process. While the Court was divided on the facts
of McIntyre, whether jurisdiction should exist at the place of injury, and
the salience of nation-wide contacts, all agreed that due process would
not permit a foreign manufacturer to be haled into a U.S. court to
litigate a dispute with a foreign party over a transaction taking place
outside the United States. 26
Whatever doubt existed that Goodyear and McIntyre might have
been isolated decisions was laid to rest two years later. In 2013, the
same year as Kiobel, the Court decided Daimler v. Bauman.27 During
the Argentine "Dirty War," as many as thirty thousand left-wing
sympathizers reportedly disappeared. In 2004, Bauman and other
Argentine nationals sued DaimlerChrysler AG ("Daimler") for violations
under the Alien Tort Claims Act, claiming that Daimler's subsidiary in
Argentina ordered state security forces to rid its plant of left-wing
sympathizers. Daimler was a German company that did not
manufacture or sell products in the United States, but owned a
subsidiary, Mercedes Benz USA, that did. Bauman sued in California
federal court, claiming the court had general personal jurisdiction over
Daimler through its subsidiary's contacts with California. The Supreme
Court again rejected a "global reach." Reaffirming its decision in
Goodyear and in a unanimous decision, Justice Ginsburg criticized the
lower court for insufficiently accounting for international comity
considerations. 28
Decisions in other contexts had similar bents. In 2015, in a foreign
sovereign immunity case, the Supreme Court unanimously found that
25. Id. at 919.
26. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 907-08 (noting under such circumstances jurisdiction would
not "be a close call") (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
27. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
28. Id. at 763.
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an Austrian state-owned railway was immune from suit for personal
injuries occurring in Austria. 29 And these decisions complement earlier
decisions in other areaS 30-including in the context of forum non
conveniens 3 1 and parallel proceedingS 32-that
make it difficult to
successfully sue foreigners in the United States for alleged unlawful
acts occurring abroad.
The reaction to these decisions, collectively and individually, was
not positive. Kiobel was decried and viewed as a betrayal. 33 Pamela
Bookman, in a widely-read Stanford Law Review article, characterized
the decisions collectively as extreme and isolationist. 34 Steve Burbank
opined that international civil litigation had become a "paper tiger." 35
Others reached similar conclusions. 36 Overall, scholars lamented what
they perceived to be evidence of disengagement with international law.
Some urged lawyers to bring state law claims in state courts under
theories of universal jurisdiction. 37 Others predicted foreign courts will

29. OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 136 S. Ct. 390, 398 (2015).
30. See generally William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (2015) (exploring different doctrines of U.S. foreign relations law and
the concept of international comity).
31. See generally Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (dismissing wrongfuldeath claims arising from air crash in Scotland); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF

LAWS § 84 (AM. LAW INST. 1969) (explaining "[a] state will not exercise jurisdiction if it is a
seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action provided that a more appropriate
forum is available to the plaintiff').
32. See generally Austen L. Parrish, Duplicative Foreign Litigation, 78 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 237 (2010) (examining the problem of duplicative foreign litigation resulting from
increased transnational litigation).
33. See, e.g., A Giant Setback for Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES (April 17, 2013),
http/nytLms/100UTMb; David G. Savage, Justices Rule U.S. Courts Not World Forum for
Human Rights Suits, L.A. TIMES, (April 17, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/print/2013
/apr/17/nation/la-na-court-human-rights-20130418; Parrish, supra note 2, at 210 n.9 (noting
critical commentary on blogs immediately following the Kiobel decision).
34. Bookman, supra note 6, at 126-27; see also Pamela Bookman, The Unsung Virtues
of Global Forum Shopping, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579 (2016) (arguing that U.S. courts
have taken "extreme measures" like "impos[ing] high barriers to global forum shopping").
35. Stephen B. Burbank, International Civil Litigation in U.S. Courts: Becoming a
PaperTiger?, 33 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 663 (2012).
36. Gardner, supra note 8 (manuscript at 1) (noting that many view the Court's
decisions as parochial); cf. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and
Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1084 (2010) (describing judicial efforts to
reduce U.S. court access in transnational cases).
37. See, e.g., Christopher A. Whytock, Donald Earl Childress III & Michael D. Ramsey,
Foreword- After Kiobel-International Human Rights Litigation in State Courts and
Under State Law, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2013) (introducing symposium on topic).
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step into the perceived breach to adjudicate transnational claims.

38

The

prevailing assessment for the future of international law and the U.S.
role in the international system has been mostly bleak.
II. A CRITIQUE OF THE PREVAILING VIEW

I start with a preliminary observation that complicates the analysis.
As with many battles before the U.S. Supreme Court, these
transnational cases were not solely, or even primarily, focused on
international and transnational issues. On the contrary, the decisions
often seemed more about separation of powers and federalism. While
the foreign affairs issues in some of the cases were at best hidden,39 the
concern of stepping on executive prerogative in the area of foreign
affairs appeared to predominate. And, at least for some on the Court,
the results in these cases may simply have been part of a broader
hesitation over private litigation as public regulation. 40 Recast this way,
these cases were as much a debate about public law litigation and tort
reform 41 as they were about international litigation or transnational
justice. They were also the backdrop against which the Justices focused
on other long-standing issues-the appropriateness of clear-statement
rules, the use of canons of construction, and whether rules should be
preferred over standards. 42 And finally, even on these domestic issues,

38. See Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next
Wave of Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO L.J. 709 (2012); Donald Earl Childress III,
Escaping Federal Law in Transnational Cases: The Brave New World of Transnational
Litigation, 93 N.C. L. REV. 995, 1000-01 (2015).
39. Cf. Hannah Buxbaum, Foreign Governments as Plaintiffs in U.S. Courts and the
Case Against "JudicialImperialism," 73 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 653, 699-712 (2016)
(describing concerns over legal imperialism, the ascendance of an imperialism narrative,
and its impact on Supreme Court cases over the past decade).
40. See Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an
Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence,84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1107-08
(2006).
41. For a stark view of transnational litigation as a product of an aggressive plaintiffs
bar, see INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, TAMING TORT TOURISM: THE CASE FOR A FEDERAL
SOLUTION TO FOREIGN JUDGMENT RECOGNITION (2013).

42. International cases are often seen as little more than extensions of domestic
doctrines. See Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign
Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1899 (2015) (describing how the Court began to
treat "foreign relations issues as if they were run-of-the-mill domestic policy issues,
suitable for judicial review and governed by ordinary separation of powers and statutory
interpretation principles"); Paul R. Dubinsky, Is TransnationalLitigation a DistinctField?
The Persistence of Exceptionalism in American ProceduralLaw, 44 STAN. J. INT'L L. 301,
341 (2008) (asserting that courts are prone to using domestic doctrines without analysis
when addressing transnational issues).

216

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

24:1

the decisions were not doctrinally clear and could be criticized for their
internal inconsistencies.
But putting these observations aside, the prevailing assessment
that the decisions reflect anti-international tendencies is problematic.
One of the core problems is the breadth of agreement from the Court's
members, including those that are broadly supportive of international
norm development. 43 In Daimler, Justice Ginsburg-long sensitive to
international issues-wrote the majority. In Justice Breyer's
concurrence to Kiobel and RJR Nabisco, he invoked international
jurisdictional law as supporting the majority's conclusion. 44 And Justice
Stevens in Morrison expressed concern over the breadth of U.S.
jurisdictional assertions. 45 All three justices are hardly isolationist. 46
Indeed, several justices have been threatened with impeachment 47 and
have received death threats for their willingness to consider foreign and
international law sources.48 And even those justices more reticent in
considering international norms appeared concerned with how
aggressively broad lower court decisions had become. 49
The decisions also are more consistent with international law than
what those advocating an expansion of jurisdictional authority would
suggest. Long-established public international law principles of

43. Alan M. Trammell, Isolating Litigants: A Response to Pamela Bookman, 68 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 33, 35 (2015) (making this point and noting that "Justice Ginsburg is the
opposite of a litigation isolationist").
44. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1673 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
concurring); RJR Nabisco Inc. v. European Cmty., 130 S. Ct. 2090, 2116 (2016).
45. Morrison v. Nat'l AustI. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 274-86 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
46. See STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW
GLOBAL REALITIES (2015).

47. Dana Milbank, And the Verdict on Justice Kennedy Is: Guilty, WASH. POsT (Apr. 9,
2005), httpJ1/ww.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentlardle/2005/04/08/AR2005040801860.html
(noting commentary saying "Kennedy 'should be the poster boy for impeachment' for citing
international norms in his opinions"); Carl Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, DeLay Says
Federal JudiciaryHas Run Amok,'Adding Congress Is Partly to Blame, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
8, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/08/politics/delay-says-federal-judiciary-has-runamok-adding-congress-is.html (describing how Senator's Coburn's Chief of Staff has called
for "mass impeachment" of federal judges).
48. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, GinsburgDiscloses Threats on Her Life: In Speeches, Justice
Says She and Sandra Day O'Connor Were Targeted Because of Use of Foreign Law in
Cases, NAT'L L.J. (Mar. 20, 2006), httpJ/www.nationallawjournaLcom/id-900005449255/
Ginsburg-Discloses-Threats-on-Her-Life?streturn-20160911224648.
49. See Anthony J. Colangelo, What Is ExtraterritorialJurisdiction?, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. 1303, 1306 (2014) (noting that "courts have been willing to hang U.S. jurisdiction on
the hook that some aspect of transnational activity comprising a claim falls within the
geographic scope of U.S. authority, even if that aspect is fleeting and minor relative to the
rest of the conduct comprising the claim").
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territorial integrity, sovereign equality, nonintervention, and selfdetermination limit one nation from interfering with the conduct of
or international
consent
absent
abroad
occurring
foreigners
agreement.50 International jurisdictional principles reflect these
foundational concepts, preventing adjudication of claims in the absence
of a close factual nexus between the dispute's subject matter and the
United States. 51 While scholars from time to time have sought to recast
international jurisdictional law to make it broader, extraterritorial
regulation of foreigners for foreign activity has long been, with narrow
exceptions, exceptional. 52 The desire to dramatically move international
law from its state-based moorings may have been an ambition, but
53
there's little authority supporting that the move has fully occurred.
For good or bad, jurisdiction under international law remains tied to
territorial sovereignty, and states continue to consider territoriality as
the most straightforward and lawful way under international law of
delimiting authority between them. 54 The adherence to this longstanding approach isn't anti-international or isolationist.
Notably, the presumption against extraterritoriality, as used in
recent transnational cases, is fairly similar to how the Court has treated
jurisdiction in other contexts. With federal court jurisdiction, the Court
has refused-absent direct and explicit Congressional authorization-to
assume that Congress has conferred on the Court the full jurisdiction
permitted under the Constitution.55 Similarly, the Court has assumed
50. For a more detailed treatment, see Austen Parrish, Reclaiming InternationalLaw
from Extraterritoriality,93 MINN. L. REv. 815 (2009).
51. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 457-58 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds.,
9th ed. 1992) (noting that the exercise of civil jurisdiction by a State is dependent on there
being "a sufficiently close connection" with the State to justify the exercise of jurisdiction).
52. See Developments in the Law - Extraterritoriality,124 HARV. L. REV. 1226, 1228
(2011) (noting that "[tihe exceptionalism of extraterritoriality reflects the foundational
ideals of the international state system").
53. See Alex Mills, Rethinking Jurisdictionin InternationalLaw, 84 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
187, 194, 198 (2014) (explaining that the international rules of jurisdiction remain
dominated by territorial considerations); VAUGHAN LOWE & CHRISTOPHER STAKER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (2010) ("The best view is that it is necessary for there to be some
clear connecting factor, of a kind whose use is approved by international law, between the
legislating state and the conduct that it seeks to regulate.").
54. See

INT'L BAR ASS'N, REPORT

OF THE

TASK FORCE

ON EXTRATERRITORIAL

JURISDICTIOn 11 (2008) (describing the "principle of territoriality" as "[tihe starting point
for jurisdiction" and "the most common and least controversial basis for jurisdiction");
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§

402 cmt. b

(AM. LAW INST. 1987) ("Territoriality is considered the normal, and nationality an
exceptional, basis for the exercise of jurisdiction.").
55. Generally the Court assumes that Congress has not intended to utilize all potential
jurisdiction allocated to it. See, e.g., Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 554 (1989)
(declining to find pendant party jurisdictional absent explicit affirmative grant by
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that Congress does not usually intend to utilize the full jurisdiction
permitted under international law or the U.S. Constitution.56 The
presumption may be overly broad and even problematic when
considering regulation of U.S. officials, but it hardly seems extreme to
err on the side of caution in areas where unilateral extraterritorial
regulation has been the most contentious.
In many ways then, the U.S. Supreme Court's most recent
pronouncements reflect not a hostility to international law, but rather a
rejection of a new legal orthodoxy that sought to reinvent jurisdictional
rules for a perceived postnational or poststatist world. Harold Koh, for
example, while not focused on jurisdictional principles, envisioned the
rise of transnational public litigation-drawing from how domestic
pubic law litigation advanced civil rights in the United States-as a way
to enforce international human rights.57 Other scholars advocated in a
similar vein and focused on expanding the role of substate actors in the
international
system.5 8
Indeed,
as
interdisciplinarity
and
transdisciplinarity surged in legal academia, a host of legal scholars
borrowed descriptive theories from other disciplines and turned those
descriptions into normative visions for global governance. So while
anthropologists and social scientists explained how the international
order has become pluralistic, legal scholars made the jump that
pluralism is normatively desirable.59 And while international relations
Congress); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1908)
(interpreting the statutory grant of federal question jurisdiction to be narrower than what
is constitutionally permitted); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806)
(interpreting the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction to be narrower than
constitutional limits).
56. See, e.g., Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010) (looking at
Congressional intent behind enacting statute for determining geographic reach of the
law).
57. Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalPublic Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347,
2347-48 (1991) ("Like its domestic counterpart . . . transnational public law litigation
seeks to vindicate public rights and values through judicial remedies."); cf. Abram Chayes,
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1281 (1976)
(landmark article describing public law litigation in the domestic context).
58. See Jose E. Alvarez, InterliberalLaw: Comment, 94 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 249,
250 (2000) (describing the central assumption of liberal theory that "the future of effective
international regulation lies not with traditional treaties . . . but with transnational
networks").
59.

See, e.g., Nico KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST STRUCTURE

OF POSTNATIONAL LAw (2010) (explaining that many areas of regional and global
governance can be understood in pluralist terms that hold normative appeal); PAUL
SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS

(2012) (describing the desirable normative force of multiple overlapping communities in
our globalized world). For an overview of global legal pluralism, see Ralf Michaels, Global
Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SCI. 243 (2009).
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scholars and political scientists described how the state has
disaggregated, legal scholars urged that the state should disaggregate
with law becoming postnational in orientation.60
The desire to move beyond territorial sovereignty as a defining
principle of international law and the attempt to change international
jurisdictional principles has some understandable short-term appeal.
First, strict territoriality has long been discarded domestically where
concepts of individual liberty and reasonableness have replaced strict
territorial theories of jurisdiction, 6' and territoriality has been
jettisoned in conflict of laws doctrine. 62 Second, transnational solutions
are often demanded in an integrated, globalized world, given the ease of
modern transportation and communication, the growth of international
trade and multinational corporations doing business across borders,
technological developments such as the internet, and the emergence of
transnational criminal organizations.6 3 Third, as the United States has
become less willing to enter into treaties and cooperate multilaterally,
the need to find other solutions to temper the negative aspects of
64
globalization became more pressing.
Under international law and in other countries, however, the turn to
unilateral extraterritorial regulation of foreigners (whether through the
courts or otherwise) has rarely been viewed as legitimate. The
unilateral attempt to prescribe conduct abroad has been roundly viewed
as exorbitant and usually inconsistent with international law.65
60. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 8 (2004) (describing
international networks globalizing justice).
61. See Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 89, 100 (1999) (describing the shift of focus to an individual liberty's
interest from concerns of reciprocal sovereignty); cf. ANDREAS LOWENFELD,
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR REASONABLENESS (1996) (advocating for a

reasonableness standard over territorial-based standards).
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 31 (replacing vested

rights theory and territorial approaches that had been advanced by the first restatement).
63. See KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE EVOLUTION

OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 118 (2009) (describing and critiquing the commonly
held position that law must become less territorially constrained when social and
economic activity globalizes).
64. See Harold Hongju Koh, Setting the World Right 115 YALE L.J. 2350, 2354 (2006)
(noting American strategic unilateralism and tactical multilateralism "characterized by a
broad antipathy toward international law and global regime-building through treaty
negotiation").
65. See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F. 3d 11, 77-78 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting in part) (listing objections to extraterritorial applications of American law by
Canada, Germany, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, South Africa, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom); A.V. Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British
Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 257, 257 (1981) (describing
deep feelings of anti-Americanism based on perceived unlawful extraterritorial application
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Unilateral extraterritorial regulation also can be deeply undemocratic
and not easily reconciled with principles of self-determination. 66 Aside
from the legitimacy question, there is also pragmatic consideration:
progress in international regulation is unlikely to be made in
hodgepodge and piece-meal fashion. The move away from multilateral
lawmaking leads to fragmentation of the international system 67 and to
the perception of American exceptionalism.6 8 In a range of contexts,
because the use of extraterritorial laws are highly contentious, attention
is diverted away from the alleged violators and the unlawful acts, and
directed instead to those bringing the claims.6 9 And after all that, the
likelihood of success for such claims remains small, thereby giving the
illusion that serious steps are being taken, when in actuality little
progress has been made.70
III. MOVING BEYOND EXTRATERRITORIALITY

Let me begin winding down my remarks by suggesting that recent
decisions provide more opportunity than cause for alarm. I begin by
highlighting common misconceptions.
One false concern is the belief that curtailing unilateral
extraterritorial regulation necessarily suggests a more limited role for
national courts. But the two are not companion concepts. One can be
concerned over unilateral extra-jurisdictional power, while believing
that domestic courts can and should play a robust role in enforcing and

of U.S. laws); John Byron Sandage, Forum Non Conveniens and the Extraterritorial
Application of United States Antitrust Law, 94 YALE L.J. 1693, 1698 (1985) (explaining
that justifications for broad extraterritorial jurisdiction was perceived as "Yankee
'jurisdictional jingoism"' spurring "wide-spread resentment"); cf. Brigitte Stern, Can the
United States Set Rules for the World? A French View, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 10 (1997)
(describing Helms-Burton Act as a "blatant violation of the international rules governing
extraterritoriality").
66. For a detailed treatment, see Parrish, supra note 50, at 859-60.
67. See Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire's New Clothes: Political
Economy and the Fragmentationof InternationalLaw, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 626 (2007).
68. See Nico Krisch, InternationalLaw in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the
Shaping of the InternationalLegal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 369, 403 (2005).
69. See Developments in the Law - Extraterritoriality, supra note 52, at 1228
(observing some benefits, but noting the "serious legal, diplomatic, and moral tensions
inherent in the extraterritorial application of law").
70. See Cortelyou C. Kenney, Measuring TrasnationalHuman Rights, 84 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1053, 1113 (2015) (examining database of human rights civil suits and finding only
modest success despite lack of evidence of parochial bias).
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developing international norms. 1 A reluctance to have national courts
adjudicate, absent agreement, claims against foreign defendants for
activity abroad, does not prevent adjudication of claims against U.S.
citizens under nationality jurisdiction principles, 72 does not prevent
incorporation of international norms in U.S. decision-making, and does
not prevent judges from engaging with international law.73 More
importantly, nothing in the Court's extraterritoriality jurisprudence
prevents treaty-based jurisdiction (e.g., reciprocal court access as part of
a bilateral or multilateral treaty scheme), and later unilateral action
sometimes is permitted when anticipated by the treaty framework
itself.74 While the United States may have withdrawn from multilateral

commitments 7 5-and indeed the rise of extraterritorial regulation may
have contributed to that withdrawal 76-one does not necessarily lead to
the other.
A similar persistent reductionist tendency is the notion that in a
globalized world, unilateral extraterritorial regulation is inevitable and
necessary. But why that would be so is unclear. Those opposed to
extensive unilateral extraterritorial regulation are not advocating for
regulatory free-zones. The position is only that transnational regulation
more meaningfully occurs through cooperative, rather than unilateral,
means. As a descriptive matter, the notion of extraterritorial
inevitability is also wrong. In the past, when the world's economy has
been highly integrated, domestic law has remained strictly territorially
prescribed.77 And we have seen nations use extraterritorial laws

71. See Benvenisti, JudicialMisgivings, supra note 1, at 160. See generally Richard A.
Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts in the InternationalLegal Order, 39 IND. L.J. 429 (1964)
(examining "the proper role of domestic courts in the international legal order").
72. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

§ 402(2)

(AM. LAW. INST. 1987);

Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932).
73. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign
and InternationalLaw by National Courts, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 241, 241 (2008).
74. Cf. Maggie Gardner, Channeling Unilateralism, 56 HARV. J. INT'L L. 297, 297
(2015) ("Because states generally cannot enforce their laws outside their own territory,
transnational criminals can evade prosecution as long as some states are unable or
unwilling to meet these treaty commitments. One solution for improving compliance with
these treaties may be, counterintuitively, more unilateralism.").
75. See Oona A. Hathaway et al., InternationalLaw at Home: Enforcing Treaties in
U.S. Courts, 37 YALE J. INT'L L. 51, 90 (2012) ("The courts of the United States are today
less willing than at any previous time in history to directly enforce the Article II treaty
obligations of the United States through a private right of action.").
76. See TONYA PUTNAM, COURTS WITHOUT BORDERS: LAW, POLITICS, AND US
EXTRATERRITORIALITY 101-201, 264 (2016) ("[W]here judicial extraterritorially is (or

becomes) less efficacious, the United States may seek to bargain internationally.").
77. RAUSTIALA, supra note 63, at 118-19.
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aggressively, even during times of isolation.78 In any case, the U.S.
Supreme Court decisions do not prohibit extraterritorial regulation, but
merely presume Congress generally does not intend to regulate
extraterritorially absent a clear indication otherwise.
Ironically, in many ways aggressive extraterritorial regulation of
foreigners is its own form of parochialism. On the one hand, it reflects
an unwillingness to move beyond narrow expertise and comfort in U.S.
law, and to engage more widely with international law and
institutions.79 On the other hand, attempts to legitimize unilateral
regulation are a weak way to justify American exceptionalism (a "belief
that the United States has a unique mission to lead the world, but
ought logically to be exempt from the rules it promotes").80 While
extraterritorial regulation was once a last resort-used when
multilateral international cooperation was beyond reasonable grasp and
when pressing problems demanded a response-no longer is it
exceptional. Its rapid and dramatic proliferation in the last few decades
suggests it is often now a first resort and a means to avoiding
cooperative involvement. As a result, broad unilateral extraterritorial
regulation itself may be reflective of a particular kind of isolationism.
The Supreme Court's recent pronouncements curtailing private
enforcement of extraterritorial regulation might then be viewed as an
opportunity and an invitation to reinvigorate multilateral negotiation
and international lawmaking. In contexts where U.S. law has applied
only domestically, the United States has been incentivized to coordinate
and negotiate multilaterally. 8 1 Conversely, extraterritorial laws have
taken the pressure off the United States to engage with international
lawmaking, 82 and sometimes have derailed the ability to reach

78. Id. at 119; see also DANIEL S. MARGOLIES, SPACES OF LAW IN AMERICAN FOREIGN
RELATIONS (2011) (describing U.S. use of extraterritorial laws as a foreign policy tool in

the 19th Century).
79. See Nico Krisch, More Equal than the Rest? Hierarchy, Equality, and U.S.
Predominance in InternationalLaw (describing the U.S. shift from international law to
domestic law as a tool of foreign policy), in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 135 (Michael Byers & Greg Nolte eds., 2003).
80. James C. Hathaway, America, Defender of Democratic Legitimacy?, 11 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 121, 121, 129 (2001) (criticizing unilateralism and explaining how consent-based
international law leads to political legitimacy and successful enforcement).
81. See PUTNAM, supra note 76, at 6, 152-201 (describing the failure of courts to extend
intellectual property rights extraterritorially fueled U.S. engagement in efforts to remake
international intellectual property rules).
82. See Parrish, supra note 50, at 871-72 (describing how extraterritorial laws
undermine incentives for cooperation, using the antitrust context as an example).
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multilateral agreement.88 In a thoughtful new book, Tonya Putnam
describes this dynamic well:
Patterns of domestic rule following (or rule evasion)
among regulated actors also shape U.S. government
incentives to engage with the governments of other
U.S.
Where
issues.
on
transnational
states
in
effective
been proven
has
extraterritoriality
safeguarding the transnational interests of U.S. entities,
there is often little urgency for the U.S. government to
bargain with others over coordinated rules. . . . Where,
by contrast, U.S. federal courts have shown themselves
unwilling or unable to protect the interests of those
seeking extraterritorial application of U.S. law, the U.S.
government has come under considerably more domestic
84
pressure to reach formal agreements with other states.
To the extent this readjustment occurs, it would be a good thing.
Longer-term progress in international law appears to demand it.85 In a
globalized world, international engagement and cooperation with others
is critical to addressing global problems. Rather than withdrawing into
the sovereign self, the United States must persuade others of the need
for change and cooperative solutions. As others have argued, "the
United States and the rest of the world would benefit from a return to
responsible multilateral engagement in which treaties regain their
86
central role."
The Court's curtailing of extraterritorial judicial regulation may
also permit a reinvigoration of academic thought in this area. So much
scholarship is focused on the narrow doctrinal issues of whether
lawsuits, themselves rarely successful, should be entertained. If
extraterritoriality is waning, it may provide incentives for scholars to

83. See Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritorialityin an Age of Globalization: The Hartford
Fire Case, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 289, 324 (describing how use of extraterritorial measures
led to retaliation and destroyed "a spirit of cooperation and common purpose in solving
international economic problems"); cf. A.V. LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION: AN

ANNOTATED COLLECTION OF LEGAL MATERIALS 197, 201 (1983) (describing diplomatic
protests to export administration regulations and noting that "[tihe United States
measures as they apply in the present case are unacceptable under international law
because .. . [t]hey seek to regulate companies not of United States nationality in respect of
their conduct outside the United States").
84. PUTNAM, supra note 76, at 6.
85. See JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD'S
ONLY SUPERPOWER CAN'T Go IT ALONE 1-4 (2002).

86. Kaye, supra note 4, at 114.
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move beyond domestic debates that have little to do with global
governance. Instead, legal academics may be challenged to more broadly
study how the United States and lawyers can play a more effective role
in coordinating the development and legitimization of international
norms and the rule of law in a way that serves U.S. interests. 8 7

I end on a note of worry. A decade ago, scholars like myself worried
about the risk of fragmentation if foreign tribunals embraced broadbased jurisdictional power. That has arguably occurred in some areas.8 8
We are in the odd circumstances where just when the United States is
modestly pulling back (at least from the judicial perspective) from broad
extraterritorial assertions, other countries have begun to push in the
opposite direction.8 9 If the cat is out of the bag, then there may be a risk
if the United States is not a player in crafting international norms in a
new market of transnational litigation.90 The idea of countries
embracing unilateral extraterritorial regulation in a pluralistic free-forall, however, is problematic, particularly at time when nationalistic,
xenophobic, and illiberal tendencies seem on the rise. There's little
evidence that in such a free-for-all international norms will develop in a
positive direction.
CONCLUSION

Over the past few years, the U.S. Supreme Court has stalled efforts
to broaden U.S. extraterritorial judicial power. The immediate reaction
has been negative, with proclamations that the retrenchment reflects an
isolationist and anti-internationalist tendency. That assessment,
however, if not mistaken, is overstated. It's unclear that the Justices
were motivated with anti-international animus. And the effect may not
be anti-internationalist either. To the extent U.S. domestic court actions
are less viable options to providing redress against foreigners for foreign
conduct, it may prompt, at least on the margins, a reinvigoration of
other more cooperative and multilateral approaches to solving global
challenges. For those skeptical of the legitimacy and efficacy of
unilateral approaches (whether through the courts or elsewhere),
87. For a discussion of scholars engaged in the empirical study of transnational
regulation, see Greg Shaffer, New Legal Realism and International Law, in THE NEW
LEGAL REALISM: STUDYING LAW GLOBALLY Vol. II at 145 (Heinz Klug & Sally
Engle Merry eds., 2016).
88. See Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL
L. REV. 481, 497-98 (2011); Bookman, The Unsung Virtues, supra note 34 (manuscript at
1-9).
89. See Childress, Escaping Federal Law, supra note 38, at 1001-02 (arguing that
foreign countries are engaged in forum competition to attract transnational cases).
90. See Bookman, supranote 6, at 1081 (making this point).
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modest pressure to spur further responsible multilateral coordination
and engagement may be a positive development. If such coordination
did occur, I can only believe that Earl Snyder-who was devoted to
studying the development of international law for almost half a
century- would be pleased.

